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Use of Transaction Cost Economics Framework to Study 






 Information Technology (IT) outsourcing can be defined as “the delegation, through a 
contractual arrangement, of all or any part of the technical resources, human resources, and 
the management responsibilities associated with providing IT services to an external vendor” 
(Clark et al., 1995). Information Systems (IS) researchers have sought an understanding of 
this phenomenon over the last decade using theories drawn from various reference 
disciplines. Transaction cost economics (TCE) (Ang and Straub, 1998), agency theory 
(Logan, 2000), and the resource based view (RBV) (Teng et al., 1995) have been the three 
most popular theories to explain IT sourcing phenomenon: they account for a majority of 
research articles in a recent review (Hui and Beath, 2001). These theories differ in their 
assumptions and ontologies in that they identify a different set of issues within their 
underlying assumptions to explain outsourcing outcomes. Traditional microeconomic 
theories of economic decision making assume an underlying economic rationality of “homo 
economicus” that maximizes expected utility, while more recent decision theories attempt to 
go beyond the narrow efficiency seeking approach of microeconomics. Among the former set 
of lenses, Transaction Cost Economics is the most frequently used approach. 
This paper introduces basic concepts of TCE by focusing on its implicit assumptions 
and fundamental constructs (Williamson, 1985). Thereafter, a sample of widely cited research 
papers applying TCE is selected and we synthesize major findings related to each TCE 
construct. These are used to put forward research questions concerning each construct and 
how the research agenda could be furthered with regard to that construct. Discussion section 
outlines some limitations of TCE, suggests alternative theoretical lenses that could overcome 
those limitations, and draws some implications for future IS research.  
 
 
Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) 
 
This section reviews Transaction cost economics, and assesses the use of its discrete 
components in the IS literature. The key constructs of TCE: frequency, asset specificity, 
opportunism, and uncertainty are explored with regard to their use and operationalization. 
This is done in parallel with critically evaluating and deconstructing the assumptions of the 
original theory.  
 
Transaction Cost Economics: Assumptions and Variables 
Frequency, asset specificity, and uncertainty form the key components of TCE that 
are used to explain how firm’s boundaries are drawn, and when a good is transacted in a 
hierarchy instead of the market. In other words, TCE sets out to predict the boundaries of the 
firm given the characteristics of a transaction along these key dimensions. Drawing on the 
work of Commons (1934) and Coase (1937), among others, Williamson’s books and papers 
have become a leading influence in management and economics to address this issue. 
In order to unpack these key dimensions of TCE, it is helpful to compare them with 
the assumptions that characterize transactions in ‘perfect’ markets in classical economic 
theory. The following table (Table 1) shows the assumptions that are relaxed in TCE in order 
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to reconcile economic theory with the organizational reality─in that we have both hierarchies 
and markets. 
 
 Neoclassical Assumptions Transaction Cost Economics Relaxations 
Information Perfect information Asymmetries, leading to uncertainty 
Buyers & sellers Many buyers and sellers Small number, leading to opportunism 
Specificity Identity of buyer/seller does not 
matter 
Identity of the buyer-seller dyad matters, leading to asset specificity 
Rationality Rational actors Economic actors are “intendedly rational, but only limitedly so”, or 
bounded rationality (Williamson, 1985) 
Maximization of 
utility 
Maximizing orientation “Unobjectionable, if all of the relevant costs are recognized.” 
(Williamson, 1985) 
 
Table 1. Transaction Cost Economics assumptions 
 
TCE relaxes the assumption of perfect information conceding that decision trees 
cannot be drawn even for moderately complex transactions in the real world. In addition, 
parties involved in the transaction do not reveal all the information they have as a symptom 
of their opportunistic behavior. A large number of buyers and sellers with nearly identical 
products (which results in market efficiency) is relaxed to ‘small numbers bargaining’. The 
good transacted, as a corollary, are somewhat specific to each buyer-seller set, which is not 
the case in the ‘open’ market. Rationality of actors is limited as they cannot recognize all 
‘relevant costs’. This assumes a complex set of utility functions which are not easily subject 
to optimization. 
Transaction cost economics then uses frequency and asset specificity to propose an 
“optimal” set of governance structure (Williamson, 1985) for each combination (Table 2). As 
Williamson suggests:  “The cost effective choice of organization form is shown to vary 
systematically with the attributes of transactions.”(Williamson, 1985) 
 
Asset Specificity  
Frequency Non-specific Mixed Idiosyncratic 
Occasional Outsource with neo-classical contract 
Recurrent 
Outsource with classical 
contract Relational contract Insource 
 
Table 2. Governance structure under Transaction Cost Economics 
 
In this framework transaction frequency is either occasional or recurrent. Asset 
specificity is related to alternative uses of the asset involved in the transaction, and it is 
measured by the lack of standardization. Highly standardized assets imply low asset 
specificity, and highly customized ones are seen to possess high asset specificity. ‘Mixed’ 
means an intermediate level of asset specificity. As shown in the framework non-specific 
assets lead to low transaction costs. In this case, the use of standard, undifferentiated 
contracts is adequate for occasional or recurrent transactions. As we move towards higher 
asset specificity, the contract differs by the frequency of transaction. For occasional 
transactions, e.g., buying capital equipment, ‘neo-classical’ contracts with third-party 
arbitration clauses are used to minimize transaction costs. For recurrent transactions, high 
asset specificity leads to high transaction costs, which are minimized by insourcing. Lower 
levels of specificity are handled by ‘relational’ contracts which try to control transaction 
costs, while taking the advantage of market efficiencies. The incentive to continue the 
relationship minimizes transaction costs. 
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Clearly, this framework suggests an optimal match between characteristics of the 
transactions and the associated governance structure but its application is limited─by 
necessity─by the choice of its main constructs and their operationalization, viz., asset 
specificity and frequency. Moreover, in line with traditional economic thinking efficiency 
seeking in the long term seems to be the only motivator considered in the sourcing decisions. 
This efficiency is, however, not absolute, but comparative and relates to the types of 
transaction characteristics that are measured on ordinal scales. 
It also seems that the suggested constructs of TCE are difficult to operationalize. 
Different authors have used different set of measures for the same construct leading to 
different confounding results. Notwithstanding arguments for TCE as a basis for theorizing 
about strategy (Williamson, 1991), difficulties in empirical work have limited the application 
of TCE theory. Disagreements concerning the empirical validity of TCE have led to mixed 
record of success in organizational and economics literature (David and Han, 2004). Yet, 
asset specificity, uncertainty, and transaction costs have been the most commonly used as 
independent variables, with the highest level of support for asset specificity. In the following 
section, we review applications of frequency, asset specificity, opportunism, uncertainty, and 
production costs, in a selected set of IS research papers related to sourcing. 
 
 
Application of Transaction Cost Economics 
 
This section reviews the application of TCE in a sample of the IT outsourcing 
literature. A representative set of widely cited research papers on IT outsourcing was created. 
We analyzed the findings concerning outsourcing decisions and how each TCE construct 
affected the choice and was operationalized in each paper. These findings suggest a set of 
research questions concerning each construct that help shape future research agenda, and also 
clarify potential theoretical contributions of TCE for IT outsourcing research. 
 
Selected Papers 
The main source of research literature on IT outsourcing was the review (Hui and 
Beath, 2001) . They selected these papers as ‘representative work’ in each substantive area of 
IT outsourcing. In addition, ABI/Inform was used to identify additional research papers in IT 
Sourcing. Each listed paper was checked separately in terms of theoretical base, research 
questions and applied research methodology. Only those papers that showed a clear use of 
Transaction Cost Economics in their theoretical base and research questions were selected for 
further analysis. As shown in table 3, most papers were selected from top-tier IS journals and 
conferences, and they mostly covered the period from 1994 to 1998. Most of the research 
involved empirical work, and details such as sample sizes, significance tests and major results 
(regressions) are reported when available. It was difficult to check for a representative sample 
across these studies in any statistical meta-analytical sense, given the narrow criteria 
deployed and the poor operationalization of many of the constructs. The key areas of interest 
were the deployment of TCE constructs and how they predicted outsourcing decisions (i.e. 
firm’s boundaries). We verified through a content and validity checks whether the construct 
was covered in the study, how it was operationalized and what (significant) results were 
observed. The significance and sign of results was important in order to compare the findings 
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Transaction Cost Economics Dimensions 
(selected operationalizations shown in brackets) 






Apte 1990 Conceptual  Y   Y Y 
Ang & 
Cummings 






1998 Survey 225 Y* 
(perceived measure of transaction cost) 
Y* 
Aubert et al 1996 Case study 10 Y* Y*  Y*  
Cheon et al 1995 Conceptual  Y Y  Y Y 








 et al 
1996 Case study 3  Y*  Y*  
Jurison 1995 Conceptual     Y Y 
Lacity & 
Willcocks 
1995 Case study 61 Y Y    
Loh 1994 Survey 226  Y  Y  
Loh & 
Venkatraman 




Nam et al 1994 Case study 10  Y  Y  










Saarinen 1994 Survey 55  Y  Y  
Smith 2003 Conceptual   Y Y  Y 
Y shows dimension(s) covered in the study, with significant or conclusive results shown by asterisk* 
 
Table 3. Application of Transaction Cost Economics in sourcing 
 
 
Main findings on Transaction Cost Economics 
 
In our sample uncertainty and asset specificity constructs were used most frequently 
in the selected articles (table 3). As expected, there are several different operationalizations 
for these key constructs. The results are somewhat mixed, and generally weak. In what 
follows, each construct is defined with reference to Williamson (Williamson, 1985) and we 
survey how studies have conformed or digressed from this reference.  
 
Uncertainty 
TCE  (Williamson, 1985) refers to uncertainty of a strategic kind “attributable to 
opportunism…bounded rationality limits are quickly reached─since the entire decision tree 
cannot be generated for even moderately complex problems” (p. 59). Strong self-interest 
seeking leads the participants to provide selective information. Given the bounded rationality, 
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it is not possible to make optimal choices. In combination these behavioral assumptions lead 
to uncertainty. 
Most empirical papers included some measure of uncertainty (Table 4). The 
conclusions on how uncertainty affects governance of IT are mixed, even somewhat 
conflicting. Support for TCE predictions was seen in case study work (Aubert et al., 1996, 
DeLooff, 1998, Heiskanen et al., 1996), and in one survey (Nam et al., 1996). The other 
surveys (Loh, 1994, Poppo and Zenger, 1998, Saarinen and Vepsalainen, 1994) did not find 
significant relation between uncertainty (as operationalized) and outsourcing. One survey-
based study (Ang and Cummings, 1997) reported higher uncertainty leading to more (not 
less) outsourcing. They observe “as technological uncertainties escalated, large banks 
adhered more closely to sourcing arrangements advocated and legitimatized by regulators.”  
Among the studies we observed a variety of operationalizations. Uncertainty was 
framed as a measurement problem (Aubert et al., 1996), in which the buyer’s ability to 
measure IS services is important. Observability and verifiability were suggested as conditions 
for effective measurement. Measurable services could be outsourced easily. In contrast, 
software development was difficult to measure, and hence, more difficult to outsource. 
Concluding that outsourcing is advisable (only) when requirements are specified in advance, 
and measured later, seemed to arise from controllability ratings (DeLooff, 1998). Heiskanen 
et al (Heiskanen et al., 1996) combined uncertainty with asset specificity to divide systems 
into routine, standard, and speculative, with recommendations as market, hybrid, and 
hierarchy, respectively. Uncertainty of IS function (Nam et al., 1996) was negatively related 
to substitution by vendor. 
 
  Uncertainty  
Article Study Type Operationalization Significance 
Ang & Cummings Survey Technological uncertainty Y* 





Requirements for services can be specified in advance, and measured 
afterwards (clear requirements) 
Y* 
 
Heiskanen et al Case study (lack of) well-specified requirements Y* 
Loh Survey Obsolescence of current h/software, Cost-performance trends, 
Quality of final outputs 
Y 
Nam et al Survey NA Y* 
Poppo Survey Technological uncertainty Y 
Saarinen Survey Requirement specification Y 
significant or conclusive results shown by asterisk* 
  
Table 4. Application of Transaction Cost Economics dimension ‘uncertainty’ in sourcing 
 
Broader measures of uncertainty were also used (Loh, 1994) which related it to 
‘dyadic costs’ showed an insignificant path coefficient. Technological uncertainty had no 
effect (Poppo and Zenger, 1998) on sourcing choices. In contrast to Heiskanen, requirement 
uncertainty (Saarinen and Vepsalainen, 1994) (similarly combined with specificity) seems to 
have no effect on sourcing choice. These results lead to the following research questions: 
 
RQ1:   Under which conditions (of asset specificity) is uncertainty a 
significant factor? 
RQ2:   Among business, environmental, or technological uncertainty, which 
factor is more relevant- as TCE only recognizes business (actor 
related) uncertainty? 
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RQ3:   How are regulatory governance perceptions formed in the first place? 
Is it ‘received wisdom’ in the industry? What are its dynamic 
characteristics? 
RQ4:   How do buyers interact with vendors and technologies at different 
stages of technology deployment, so as to form varying perceptions of 
uncertainty? 
RQ5:   How is uncertainty related to trust, and what are its antecedents in the 
context of sourcing? 
 
Asset Specificity 
TCE (Williamson, 1985) classifies assets on their degree of specificity, as wholly 
specific and non-specific (p. 54-55). These are explained further as “durable investments that 
are undertaken in support of particular transactions, the opportunity cost of which is much 
lower in best alternative uses or by alternative users…”. In other words, it refers to the lack of 
alternative use of underlying assets. 
This can be regarded easily to be the most important construct of TCE- which 
differentiates it from neoclassical economics. It is claimed that “the importance of asset 
specificity to Transaction Cost Economics is difficult to exaggerate…” (p. 56) although 
additional conditions are added later in this stream. Yet, the papers shows weak support for 
this key construct (table 5). Two case study papers (Aubert et al., 1996, Heiskanen et al., 
1996) and one survey-based article (Poppo and Zenger, 1998) show evidence that supports 
transaction cost theory, while others show insignificant results. 
Type of activity (Aubert et al., 1996), with software development and operations at 
the opposite ends of spectrum, seemed to explain outsourcing. When firm specificity was 
combined with requirement uncertainty, sourcing decisions (Heiskanen et al., 1996) could be 
explained. Lower satisfaction was observed with outsourced activities as these became 
(Poppo and Zenger, 1998) more firm-specific.  
 
  Asset Specificity  
Article Study Type Operationalization Significance 
Ang & Cummings Survey Investment in specialized equipment, Specialized technical 
skills specific to (buyer) firm, Specific business skills & 
knowledge to buyer 
Y 
Aubert et al Case study Software development activity (type) Y* 
Heiskanen et al Case study Specificity to buyer company Y* 
Lacity & Willcocks Case study Seen as support/commodity or specialized Y 
Loh Survey Overall architecture, Operating procedures, IT 
knowledge/experience base, IT staff training 
Y 
Nam et al Survey NA Y 
Poppo Survey Firm-specific assets Y* 
Saarinen Survey Managers’ estimates, Level of using existing system as a 
basis for requirements 
Y 
significant or conclusive results shown by asterisk* 
 
Table 5. Application of Transaction Cost Economics dimension ‘asset specificity’ in sourcing 
 
At an overall level (Ang and Cummings, 1997) specificity shows weak correlation 
with outsourcing. However, analogous to the effect of regulatory influence, interaction with 
firm size and peer influence showed expected effects. Broader measures of asset specificity 
(Loh, 1994) and relating it to ‘dyadic costs’ showed an insignificant path coefficient. In 
trying to explain the extent of substitution by vendors, asset specificity (Nam et al., 1996) 
was not significant. Specificity (Saarinen and Vepsalainen, 1994) of the system, when 
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combined with uncertainty, seemed to have no effect on sourcing choice. The research 
questions raised by these results are: 
 
RQ1.   Which assets are relevant (operating procedures, knowledge of 
business rules, architectural), to measure specificity? 
RQ2.   With respect to which actor (buyer, vendor, technology, or their 
combinations) should the asset specificity be measured? 
RQ3.   What is the nexus with (types of) uncertainty? 
 
It would seem that IT sourcing practices have evolved to make intangible assets more 
relevant. In this respect, technologies which affect coordination and agility, rather than 
simple automation of tasks, need more attention and theorizing. Research on 
interorganizational systems, where ownership of assets is distributed, could be an interesting 
area for research. 
 
Frequency 
TCE (Williamson, 1985) defines governance structures  (p. 60) as “more sensitively 
attuned to the governance needs of non-standard transactions than are unspecialized 
structures, ceteris paribus”. Frequency of transaction is involved, ranging from occasional to 
recurrent. 
This dimension was used in four papers, as shown in table 6. Some of these (Apte, 
1990, Cheon et al., 1995) are conceptual papers, which hypothesize that low frequency could 
lead to high transaction costs. The logics are similar, in that infrequency of contracting 
(Cheon et al., 1995) will increase ‘relationship building costs’, or alternatively, buyer should 
use the same vendor (Apte, 1990) in multiple contracts. 
 
  Frequency 
Article Study Type Operationalization Significance 
Apte Conceptual # sourcing contracts with same vendor Y 
Aubert et al Case study Use of different skills Y* 
Cheon et al Conceptual Infrequency of contracting Y 
Lacity & Willcocks Case study Ongoing activities or occasional Y 
significant or conclusive results shown by asterisk* 
 
Table 6. Application of Transaction Cost Economics dimension ‘frequency’ in sourcing 
 
The results differ when looking at empirical work (Aubert et al., 1996, Lacity and 
Willcocks, 1995). It is interesting to see how the authors look for alternative explanations and 
units of analysis to reconcile their results with TCE. Aubert et al (1996) conclude that 
“frequency refers to the use of skills…rather than software development projects”. In their 
case study sample, most firms were sourcing externally for skills that were required 
intermittently. The emphasis, therefore, is more on a load leveling function, rather than 
transaction cost. However, these results do not strictly conflict with TCE, which would 
expect external contracting for occasional transactions. Another study (Lacity and Willcocks, 
1995) attempted to classify its observations into different contract types (according to 
governance structures shown in table 2), using the information on asset-specificity and 
frequency from their interviews. Even when a limited set of sourcing decisions was 
considered (those which were believed to be successful by the sampled firms), anomalies 
were detected. Activities’ recurrent nature along with high asset specificity was expected to 
result in a relational contract (table 2), but the actual sourcing arrangements were structured 
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as neo-classical contracts, i.e., in the top half of the table (instead of lower half). An 
alternative explanation within TCE framework is that decision making was necessarily 
occasional, motivating IS managers to perceive it as akin to buying capital equipment. This 
leads us to the following research questions: 
 
RQ1:   Is ‘transaction’ as a unit of analysis applicable to IS sourcing context? 
RQ2:   What does frequency refer to (buying, use, decision making)? 
RQ3:   Does decision making dictate the ‘frequency’ that should be used? 
 
As sourcing arrangements tend to emphasize more relational elements, with multi-
year contracts, the timeframe is redefined. This would suggest scope for “longitudinal” 
application (David and Han, 2004) of TCE. Given that decision making is occasional, and 
dominated by relational factors, cultural fit and other social antecedents might become 
important. At which point these factors become important, is a key question for research. 
 
Opportunism 
TCE (Williamson, 1985) refers to three levels of self-interest (p. 47), from obedience, 
simple self-interest seeking, to opportunism. Among these, opportunism is “the strongest 
form” that refers to “incomplete or distorted disclosure of information, especially to 
calculated efforts to mislead, distort, disguise, obfuscate, or otherwise confuse”. Strictly 
speaking, opportunism is a behavioral assumption of TCE, along with bounded rationality. 
This dimension of Transaction Cost Economics is included in four empirical papers 
(Table 7). While there are no conflicting results, the levels of significance are not high. It 
seems that the context has a role, and the limited explanation that opportunism provides is a 
concern. 
When the construct is operationalized (Ang and Cummings, 1997) as the availability 
of large number of suppliers, the variable was significantly correlated to higher outsourcing. 
When the results were analyzed by influencer and size of firm, the effect was significant for 
peer conformity in large buyers.  
 
  Opportunism 
Article Study Type Operationalization Significance 
Ang & Cummings Survey Adequate supplier presence Y* 
De Looff Case study many suppliers Y* 
Loh & Venkatraman Survey Breach of contract by vendors 
Dependence on specific vendors 
Biased portrayal of benefits by vendors 
Y* 
 
Nam et al Survey potential number of vendors Y 
significant or conclusive results shown by asterisk* 
 
Table 7. Application of Transaction Cost Economics dimension in sourcing 
 
Two papers show somewhat weaker results. Using case study approach (DeLooff, 
1998) availability of sufficient suppliers is seen as an ‘advisable’ condition for outsourcing, 
as it reduces small number bargaining problem. However, the controllability criterion is 
judged to be ‘medium’ in importance by general managers as well as IS managers. In 
contrast, cost is seen as highly important, more so by general managers. The other study (Loh 
and Venkatraman, 1995) concludes that average degree of outsourcing is negatively related to 
potential opportunism, though it shows the lowest levels of significance among the 
independent variables used. 
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In contrast, Nam et al (Nam et al., 1996) use the extent of substitution by vendors as a 
dependent variable while  the potential number of vendors is seen to be insignificant. These 
results lead to the following research questions: 
 
RQ1:   What are possible measures of opportunism, e.g., relative size of 
buyer/seller firm, length of contract? 
RQ2:   How are peer perceptions on ‘adequacy’ (Ang and Cummings, 1997) 
formed in the first place?  
RQ3:   Is the presence of opportunism a ‘received wisdom’ in the industry? 
What are its dynamic characteristics? 
 
Assumptions of self-interest seeking behavior need to be revisited, diluting the basis 
of TCE. The conditions under which IT enables cooperation have also been theorized (Kumar 
and van Dissel, 1996). Raising questions on behavioral assumptions, and setting the 
phenomenon under institutional context holds promise. Behaviors of vendors, and the 
antecedents of fairness, are also interesting new research avenues. 
 
Production Cost 
Although TCE sets to go beyond “neoclassical production cost” some empirical 
studies included production cost factor in addition to the dimensions of transaction costs in 
their analysis (Table 8). These results seem to be more conclusive, with each of the papers 
showing high explanatory power of the construct. 
 
  Production Cost 
Article Study Type Operationalization Significance 
Ang & Cummings Survey External production cost advantage Y* 
Ang & Straub Survey Perceived production cost advantage Y* 
De Looff Case study Advantages of scale Y* 
Poppo Survey scale economies at buyer firm Y* 
 
significant or conclusive results shown by asterisk* 
 
Table 8. Application of product cost in outsourcing decisions 
 
Comparative production cost advantage through IT outsourcing (Ang and Straub, 
1998) was related to higher degree of IS outsourcing. While transaction costs were also 
significantly related to outsourcing, the effect was much smaller. Similar results were seen 
(Ang and Cummings, 1997) where (external) production cost advantages significantly 
correlated with outsourcing. Advantages of scale (DeLooff, 1998), leading to low cost, were 
seen as an important criteria by managers- more so among general managers. Scale 
economies were seen as important when related to insourcing (Poppo and Zenger, 1998). 
The results do not contradict TCE, as “the object is not to economize on transaction 
costs but to economize in both transaction and neoclassical production cost respects.” 
(Williamson, 1985) (p. 61) However, it raises the hypothetical question: would the effects 
that were seen to support TCE prevail, if this measure had been incorporated? It is possible 
that the relatively unclear effects of transaction costs would be even weaker, in an extended 
and comprehensive operationalization of theory. 
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Discussion and Conclusions 
 
There is probably an over-application of TCE in outsourcing research in the sense that 
transaction costs so far have not added substantially to our understanding of IT sourcing- in 
particular why these decisions are made. It seems that production costs are adequate to 
explain the decision outcomes under TCE assumptions of efficiency-seeking. Limited 
empirical support for other constructs has been observed in more comprehensive reviews of 
TCE, however (David and Han, 2004). Alternatively, a better explanation of the phenomenon 
is required, than what current operationalizations of TCE offer in IT sourcing. A related issue 
is the sole use of TCE and economics as a reference discipline to explain decision outcomes.  
Based on the selected set of articles we might conclude that production cost 
advantages are so high that transaction costs are only a minor factor in IT sourcing decisions. 
TCE leaves the door open to this possibility (Williamson, 1985) “Whether transaction cost 
economies are realized at the expense of scale economies or scope economies thus needs to 
be assessed. A trade-off framework is needed to examine the production cost and governance 
cost ramifications of alternative modes of organization simultaneously.”  Accordingly, cost 
pressures (Apte, 1990, Ang and Straub, 1998) and cost predictability were seen as key factors 
by some authors.  
An overlay of institutional factors on efficiency-seeking behavior might hold some 
potential in explaining the confusing results. It has been suggested (Roberts and Greenwood, 
1997) that institutional constraints can be ‘grafted’ on the TCE framework. In this integrated 
framework, cognitive constraints are hypothesized to limit the evaluation of extant sourcing 
arrangement, and the subsequent search for alternatives. The institutional environment further 
limits the consideration set into a smaller set of legitimated designs. As there are limited ways 
of inferring (rather than observing) cost efficiencies, only highly legitimate designs are 
ultimately selected. 
Grounded theory (Glaser and Strauss, 1967) is yet another approach, given its success 
in study of phenomena less tractable by existing theories. Given the unique nature of IT 
(Lacity and Willcocks, 1995), it is possible that resulting theory could be different from the 
dynamic capabilities framework, and possibly resemble the relational view (Dyer and Singh, 
1998). 
One promising and more specific way to theorize around the phenomenon is to move 
the discussion to co-evolutionary drivers of outsourcing in contrast to studying only cost-led 
determinants. There are some starting points into this direction in the articles, e.g., vendor 
availability has dramatically increased (Apte, 1990). This could be explained by expansion of 
large IT firms (e.g., HP) into services, and increased global sourcing (Greenemeier, 2002). 
Anecdotal evidence of growth in variety and size of outsourcing contracts would suggest a 
co-evolution of vendor capability, industry practice, and buyer behaviors. Buyer requirements 
could lead to vendors’ capability augmentation in an IT activity, which then leads to new 
outsourcing arrangements and successes. Alternatively, vendors could stretch their 
capabilities to identify and serve new needs thereby increasing pressures on buyers to 
outsource. These innovations then diffuse among less innovative peers, gaining acceptance as 
an “established practice”. Highly publicized contracts, such as Kodak (1989) and British 
Petroleum (early 90’s) could serve as catalysts in this process. As institutional acceptability 
increases, it leads to more firms using outsourcing.  
This dynamic view of organizations and environment involves “the joint outcome of 
managerial intentionality, environment, and institutional effects” (Lewin and Volberda, 1999) 
with cycles of innovation and imitation. Markus and Robey (1988) discussed early on of the 
types of process theories that are available to IS researchers to explain such processes. While 
imperative theories are generally variance theories, and organizational/emergent ones are 
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process theories, trying to develop an imperative process model has great appeal. It helps 
overcome the static nature of variance models, because “while recognizing and accepting the 
complexity of causal relationships…(maintain) the goals of generalizability and prediction” 
(Markus and Robey, 1988). However, an imperative process model will require longitudinal 
data. 
In conclusion, the paper ‘unpacks’ TCE research into outsourcing by looking at its 
hidden assumptions and different operationalizations. It complements more wide ranging 
reviews of TCE (David and Han, 2004) by discussing its application to specific phenomenon- 
IT outsourcing. It also looked for new explanations of sourcing decisions by recommending a 
co-evolutionary driver approach. In many ways, the paper adds a new voice to the call for 
research (Hui and Beath, 2001) that draws upon an evolutionary perspective of IT service 
evolution, including all key stakeholders─buyers as well as sellers, and the IT artifact. The 
limitations of the paper include a limited sample of the literature that does not offer 
possibilities for meta-analytic procedures, along with the coarse operationalizations of 
constructs considered for analysis. A similar analysis on a larger sample (if possible) would 
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